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THE CARROT VS. THE STICK IN WORK
TEAM MOTIVATION

ABSTRACT

This paper reports on the use of carrot (positive) and stick (negative) incentives as
methods of increasing effort among members of work teams. We study teams of four members
in a laboratory environment in which giving effort towards the team goal is simulated by eliciting
voluntary contributions towards the provision of a public good. We test the efficiencyimproving properties of four distinct environments: monetary prizes given to high contributors
versus monetary fines assessed to low contributors, where high/low contributor is defined first in
terms of absolute contributions and then in terms of contributions relative to abilities-which we
call handicapping. Our results show that both carrot and stick increase efficiency levels by
11-29%. We find that handicapped incentives promise the highest efficiency levels, and when
handicapping is not used certain types of penalties may be more effective than prizes. The
implications for work teams and suggestions for practical implementation are discussed.
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THE CARROT VS. THE STICK IN WORK
TEAM MOTIVATION*
I.

Introduction
While work teams have risen dramatically in popularity over the last decade, there is still

no consensus as to the proper way to motivate individual team members. The potential for
shirking and free-riding on the efforts of other team members limits the effectiveness of
compensation purely based on team output, while individual piece-rates do not provide
cooperative incentives. More sophisticated methods of compensation might involve some
combination of payments based on both individual work as well as team output (e.g., profit
sharing, productivity gainsharing, or individual bonuses). The focus of this paper is the use of
positive versus negative incentives-the carrot versus the stick-in motivating team members to
give more towards the group goal.
We report on a series of experiments that document significantly higher group giving
when carrot or stick incentives are used. The framework used for analyzing the work team
problem that motivates this study is a public goods framework (see Alehian and Demsetz (1972)
for an early notice of the work team/public good connection). Contributions towards provision
of a public good are interpreted as team work effort, while token endowments are interpreted as
ability.! With asymmetrically endowed individuals (e.g., different abilities), incentive schemes
based on contributions relative to endowment (i.e., handicapped incentives) are shown the most
effective in eliciting higher levels of giving. The 7% additional efficiency improvement due to
certain handicapped incentives shows that, while a handicapped incentive scheme would be more
costly to implement, employers can often expect to receive more team effort in return. Our
*The author is grateful to the Research Council at Colgate University for funding these experiments. The
paper has benefitted from helpful conversations with R. Mark Isaac, the participants of the economics seminars at
Colgate University (a joint seminar with Hamilton College) and Utah State University, and the conference
participants at the Economic Science Association Fall 1999 meetings in Grenoble, France. Correspondence to the
author should be addressed to David L. Dickinson, Department of Economics, Utah State University, 3530 Old
Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322-3530.
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experimental design also utilizes two different methods of implementing negative incentives, and
a key result is that different types of incentives interact differently with handicapping. For
example, with no handicapping we find that the negative incentives that more successfully
internalize the loss-e.g., a monetary fine-increase efficiency by 5% more than prizes or
noninternalized penalties (such as refundable employer-posted bond).
We offer these results not only as support for incentives of all types, but also as evidence
of their differing complementarities with handicapping. And, while these incentive plans are
costly in general, we find that they increase group wealth by an amount greater than the size of
the "prize" in the carrot plans (see also Dickinson and Isaac (1998)). In other words, these plans
are not only efficiency enhancing but they may be self-funding. 2
In exploring a variety of motivation strategies, we should note the existence of penalty
strategies in a variety of settings. Many examples can be found of firms using negative
incentives as a method of eliciting effort: verbal warnings, unpaid leave-of-absence, demotion,
dismissal, etc. Pryor (1984) gives evidence from the 1980s that in the 44% of nonunionized
manufacturing firms (and 25% of unionized firms) more than 5% of workers are fired annually
for poor performance. Military boot camps, religious schools, and traditional parental discipline
are other institutions notorious for the use of negative incentives for motivation. While monetary
penalties are not typically used in the work place, it is clear that one could use different sorts of
"fines" as an alternative method of eliciting the desired behavior.
Dickinson and Isaac (1998) report on a series of experiments that analyze team
production by studying public goods provision. What is original in their study is the introduction
of individual monetary rewards or "prizes" for high absolute contribution levels in one treatment,
and for high relative (to endowment) contribution levels in another treatment. Both treatments
are found to significantly increase contribution levels compared to a baseline of no prizes, and
rewarding individuals based on relative levels of giving increases contributions by even more
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than does rewarding based on absolute levels of giving. The apparent promise of calculated
compensation schemes that introduce such individual rewards leads us to wonder about the
possibilities and applicability of similarly calculated penalties for low levels of contribution.
This paper, in fact, extends from Dickinson and Isaac to look at the effects of such penalties.
We should also note that our introduction of both penalties and prizes into the team
production environment creates a tournament element in the decision-making process. Once
workers are handicapped for ability levels, the tournament theory results from Lazear and Rosen
(1981) would imply that a rank-order tournament exists as a theoretically optimal labor contract.
Support of the predictions of tournament theory is found in Bull et al. (1987). Our experiments,
however, involve a combined method of payment to team members as opposed to giving one
payment per individual and so are not directly comparable to the Lazear and Rosen framework. 3
Schotter and Weigelt (1992) use controlled experiments to explore tournaments among
heterogeneous-ability subjects. When individuals faced differing cost-of-effect functions the
authors find, among other things, that when the rules of the tournament are altered to favor the
disadvantaged group, effort levels increased in the whole group. Our results are consistent with
these and with Dickinson and Isaac in that the creation of equity actually increases efficiency.
One key difference is that Schotter and Weigelt create a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium at full
contributions in their experiments. In this paper, we purposefully create an environment in
which there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium at full contributions. 4

2. The Experimental Environment and the Penalties
Our intent is to objectively compare the incentive effects of rewarding individuals with a
monetary prize to those of penalizing individuals with a similar monetary fine. The framework
for the penalty structure we use follows the reward structure of Dickinson and Isaac. 5 We
calibrate the size of the prize and the penalty so that their introduction does not create an
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4
equilibrium prediction of higher contribution levels relative to the baseline. The two prize
treatments are called Absolute Prize and Relative Prize for the treatments that give a monetary
prize to the individual who contributes the highest amount in absolute terms (Absolute Prize) and
relative to endowment (Relative Prize). The Relative treatment, therefore, refers to the incentive
environment with handicapping. Similarly, we will refer to the penalty treatments using the
terms Absolute and Relative to describe no-handicapping and handicapping, respectively.
We first discuss the payoff functions and prize levels used in the prize treatments. Teams
are comprised ofN=4 individuals per team, and individuals are given an endowment of tokens in
each round of a multi-round set of decisions (a treatment). Individuals are each given a different
endowment of tokens, Wi' per round (17, 19,21, or 23), but a given individual's endowment is
the same in every round. Recall that these heterogeneous endowments of tokens represent
abilities of different team members to contribute towards the group good.
In a given round, each individual then makes a decision of how many tokens to keep in a
private account which generates 1 cent per token for that individual, and how many to place in a
group account which, for each token contributed, generates 112 cent for each member of the
team. As such, each individual has the dominant strategy incentive to not contribute any tokens
to the group account and thus free-ride off other team members. The group payoff, however,
would be maximized if everyone contributed all tokens to the group account-this is the Pareto
efficient outcome. These are the classic multiperson Prisoner's Dilemma incentives. Per round
payoffs for each team member i are represented by the payoff function
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Here,

W;

is the endowment, m; is the number of tokens contributed to the group account (so

L m is the size of the public good), and q and a are payoff conversion parameters that can be
i

i

adjusted to alter the marginal payoffs of contributing tokens. In equation (1), the first term
represents the team member's private account payoffs, and the second term represents the group
account payoffs. For our experiments described above, we have q=l and a=1/2.
For the prize treatments, a prize P of size P=$.20 is given for high absolute and relative
contribution levels. The prize is chosen to satisfy two conditions: the free-riding incentive and
the prize saliency condition (see Dickinson and Isaac). Essentially, the condition of prize
saliency is one in which the prize is large enough so that every team member has the incentive to
try to win the prize outright, but not to win a lIN share of the prize-this, since the tie-breaking
rule will be to split the prize upon a tie among two or more team members. The free-riding
incentive ensures that the marginal gain of contributing a token to the group account is less than
the loss in the absence of any prize. Given the size of the prize chosen, along with our tiebreaking rule, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the stage game for either prize
treatment (mixed strategy equilibria will be discussed shortly). Pareto efficiency remains at full
contributions by all team members. Note the free-riding incentive, the prize saliency condition,
and the tie-breaking rule are all critical to the prediction of no pure-str,ategy Nash equilibrium.
The payoffs under the Absolute Prize treatment is

(2)

*i
forallj * i

U; = q(w; -m;)+aLm;

if m; < m j for all j

U; =q(w; -m;)+aLm; +P

if m; > mj

U; =q(w; -m;)+aLm; +%1
I

if m;= mj for the N 1 tied individuals

r
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For Relative Prize, payoffs are also given in (2) if we interpret the >, =, and < conditions as
referring to relative contributions.
To proceed in constructing a penalty treatment that will be compared to the prize
treatment (with P=$.20), we flrst start with a penalty of P-=$.20. Appendix A establishes penalty
saliency for our penalty environment when the size of the penalty is the same as the size of our
prize. For our penalty environment to be equivalent in marginal incentives to the prize
environments requires not that we merely penalize the low contributor, but rather that we
penalize all team members who are not the highest contributor (i.e., the (N-l)/N lowest
contributors). To penalize only the lowest absolute or relative contributor, while somewhat similar, is actually a different incentive structure. 6 The payoff to individual i under Absolute
Penalty is

Ui
(3)

=q(Wi-mi)+a~>i{~n p-

U; =q(w;-m;)+aLm;
U; = q(w;

-m;)+a~m;
,

-PhI

. if m; < m j for all j

*i

if m; > m j for all j

*i

if m·=
mJ. for the N I tied individuals
,

Interpreting the >, =, and < conditions in (3) as those for relative contributions yields payoffs for
Relative Penalty. Pareto efflciency is still at full contributions. As in the prize treatments, there
are 20 cents in marginal gains to be distributed among the team members, and so Pareto
optimality is independent of whether incentives are a prize or an avoided penalty. The proofs
that we have no pure strategy Nash equilibrium prediction in either Penalty treatment are similar
for those in the prize treatments. 7 The formal proofs are available upon request.
The non-existence of pure strategy equilibria in the penalty and prize treatments does not,
of course, imply that there are no equilibria. Mixed strategy equilbria will certainly exist. The
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large number of pure strategy choices for each individual makes the calculation of mixed strategy
equilibria for the 4 person-game prohibitively difficult. However, some useful insights can be
gleaned from a simplified 2-person game example.
Assume a 2-person prize incentive game with endowments 18 and 22, a=.75, and P=7.
These parameters ensure we have the free-riding condition as well as prize saliency. If we
simplify the strategy space to the choice of either m;=O, m;=w;, or m;=.5w;, then the game yields
no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 8 A mixed strategy equilibrium can be calculated where the
low endowment individual mixes between {a, .5w;, w;} with probabilities {43%, 18%, 39%} and
the high endowment individual mixes between {a, .5w;, w;} with probabilities {64%, 32%, 4% }for

an Absolute Prize game. The mixing equilibrium in the corresponding Relative Prize game is
{21 %, 57%, 22%} and {36%, 29%, 35%} for the low and high endowment individuals,
respectively. The mixed strategy equilibria change with the initial parameterization of the game
j

(e.g. wj=10, w2=14, a=.74, and P=4 yields a different mixing equilibrium)9, but such equilibria
seem to have in common the following: the low endowment individual mixes across strategies
somewhat more equally in Absolute Prize than in Relative Prize (where an interior level of
contributions is more likely chosen); the high endowment individual almost never fully
contributes in Absolute Prize, and in Relative Prize mixes somewhat equally across the three
strategy choices. .
A preview of the results (see Figure 3) shows that individuals of all endowment levels
seem to contribute either all or nothing to the team account. As such, if our simplified games
yield insights that can be generalized to a larger strategy space and a larger number of players, it
does not seem that individuals are playing a mixed strategy equilibrium. Indeed, the assumption
that each player's randomization is statistically independent of the opponents' is most likely not
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true. We note in the results section that players' contributions are statistically significantly
affected by what opponents had done in the previous round.
3. Experimental Procedures 10

Experiments were hand run with one 4-person team in the room at a time. Information on
endowments and contributions of each team member is private information in these experiments.
In each round, team members make the allocation decision between the private and group
accounts. Each experiment consists of all 5 treatments (baseline and the 4 incentive treatments)
and, while the incentive treatments are always randomized in order, the baseline is always the
first treatment. II Each treatment consists of 8 rounds and so each experimental team member
makes 40 decisions in the experiment.
After allocation decisions have been made, the experimenter circulates through the room
and documents each individual's contribution of tokens to the group account. Total
contributions to the group account are announced and written on t~e blackboard, and team
members referred to a Table of Payoffs from the group account which informed them what their
own earnings would be in that round for all possible contingencies of tokens placed in the group
account.12 Individual contribution levels were never revealed, and communication is not allowed
during the experiments (team members are scattered in a large room with their backs facing each
other to avoid any nonverbal communication).13
The difference between the Baseline versus incentive treatments is that, once total
contributions to the group account have been announced, the high contributor to the group
account is announced. Only the token amount (or percentage of contributions) is announced,
however, and the individual who contributed that high amount is never identified. For a prize

9

treatment there is an announcement that "the individual who placed the high number (or
percentage) of tokens in the group account will add $.20 to his or her earnings for this round."
As previously noted, we implement the penalty incentives in two different ways. A basic
penalty that may not be internalized by the worker is accomplished by endowing each subject
with an additional $.20 in startup cash (in addition to the token endowment) for each round. Any
subject who does not place the most tokens (absolute or relative) in the group account forfeits the
additional $.20 cents (or partially forfeits it if tied for high contributions). We call the
handicapped and no-handicapped version of this incentive structure Relative and Absolute
Penalty. A related penalty scheme that may be more successful at internalizing the loss (and
therefore changing the individual's reference point) would actually take $.20 away from the
subjects' earnings at the end of the round if not a high contributor-but no additional startup
cash is provided.14 To compensate for the income effect of this second type of penalty scheme,
we raise each subject's per round endowment of tokens by 10. 15 We call these treatments
Relative and Absolute Internalized Penalty.
Appropriate announcements are made in all Penalty treatments so that individuals know
whether or not they subtract (or "forfeit") some, all, or none of the $.20 penalty in that round.
For the Absolute Penalty treatment, the announcement is that "the individual who contributed X
-

-,

tokens will not forfeit the additional 20 cents for this round. All others will forfeit the entire 20
cents for this round." For the Absolute Internalized Penalty treatment, the announcement is that
"the individual who contributed X tokens will not subtract 20 cents from earnings for this round.
All others will subtract 20 cents from earnings for this round." Appropriate adjustments were
made for the Relative and Relative Internalized Penalty treatments, and the announcements of

10
both penalties and prizes were altered appropriately in the event that more that one individual
tied in contributing the most tokens (absolute or relative) to the group account for that round.
While no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the stage game for the incentive
treatments, there is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium at complete free-riding in the
baseline. As such, the incentive treatments and the baseline are not fully comparable, but it will
serve as a useful comparison to the incentive treatment in terms of team efficiency. Total
earnings for each team member in any round are the private plus group account earnings and,
when applicable, the addition of any prize or subtraction of any penalty. Once the experiment
was completed, subjects were paid their earnings-individually, in private, and in cash.

4. Results
A total of 20 experiments were run using undergraduates recruited primarily from
introductory level economics courses at Colgate University in the spring of 1998 and 1999. Ten
J

experiments involved a Baseline, Prize and Penalty treatments (absolute and relative) and 10
others involved a Baseline, Prize and Internalized Penalty treatments (absolute and relative). The
experiments lasted approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes each. In addition to earnings from
participation in the experiment, subjects were also paid a $5 show up fee. Average total payoffs
for all subjects were $18.11, ranging from a high of$21.25 to a low of$14.75. The aggregate
experimental results are shown in Figure 1, with a separate graph for each set of 10 experiments.
It is apparent from Figure 1 that the incentive treatments are effective in raising team

efficiency levels. 16 Efficiency (contri~utions) tends to be higher when handicapping is used, and
all incentive treatments increase efficiency above the baseline. Relative Prize appears to elicit
the highest efficiency levels. In addition to higher contributions in the incentive treatments, the
dispersion in contributions across endowment levels is also larger in the incentive treatments.

11
____________________FIGUREIHERE_______________________
Intragroup variance in contributions
In addition to the basic efficiency results, employers managing work teams are
presumably interested in the cohesion of the work team. One factor that might threaten this
cohesion would be an incentive scheme that created a wide gap between effort levels of the high
and low effort supplier in the team project. Figure 2 shows averaged contributions by
endowment levels for all experiments. It is apparent that the dispersion in contribution levels is
larger in the incentive treatments compared to the Baseline (p=.01 in the Mann Whitney U-tests
on the aggregate differences).17 Further, non-handicapped incentives seem to increase this variance by even more (p-value of at least .05 on each pairwise comparison except for comparing
Relative and Absolute Prize from the top graph of Figure 2 (here, p=.lO)).
_________________FIGURE 2 HERE_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
J

It is important to note that if an employer implements nonhandicapped incentives, though

cheaper and still effective in improving efficiency (especially with internalized penalties), group
stability may be harmed the most. We presume that a foundation for effective work teams is
some sense of "togetherness". It is hard to imagine this persisting in an environment in which
the effort supply of individual team members remains so asymmetric.
Figure 3 highlights another interesting detail of the aggregate results. Figure 3 shows the
distributions of contributions for each endowment level, averaged across all experiments. From
this we see that contributions follow a bimodal distribution-team members most frequently
contribute all or nothing. How realistic is it that individuals either try as hard as they can or shirk
completely? While such extremes are probably not very realistic, we could easily interpret a
contributions level of zero as being effort at the minimum required level for employment. The
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decision in the experiment would then be analogous to individuals choosing how much above

minimum required effort they will supply towards the team's goals. I8 It is then more sensible
that team members might contribute the minimum expected amount when they feel that the
benefits of the incentive program are out of reach, while others might try their hardest.
Figure 3 would also cast doubt on the possibility that individuals are playing a mixed
strategy equilibrium. Even under loose interpretations of "complete free-riding", "50%
contributions", and "full contributions"-those not requiring exact 0%, 50%, or 100%
contributions-high endowment players contributed all of their tokens 60%-70% of the time in
the non-handicapped treatments. While simplified, the 2-person example given in Section 2
suggests less frequent full contributions. Also, the low-endowment individual in our example
played 50% contributions relatively more frequently in the mixing distribution example for
handicapped incentives. Our results show that contributions between 33%-66% of an
J

individual's endowment is the least chosen option by the average individual of any endowment
level. It is possible that our example is too simplified to handle the larger strategy space of the
actual experiment, but we may also speculate that the mixed strategy equilibrium may not be
played due to a violation of the assumption of independence or players' randomization. This
conclusion is supported in the following regression analysis.
FIGURE 3 HERE--------------------

----------------~-----

Treatment Effects and Behavioral Model
For a basic test of the treatment effects we model individual team member contributions
as a function of the treatment within the experiment as well as the round within the treatment. It
has been noted that these incentive experiments involve a more complicated "game" than the
simple baseline contributions exercise. While this paper does not attempt to construct a
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theoretical model that would generate our experimental outcomes, we include a second empirical
specification that includes additional behavioral variables. The behavioral variables chosen
reflect the potential importance of how individuals respond to what happened in the previous .
round: whether they benefited from the incentive treatment (e.g., won the prize), whether they
shared the benefits, whether they could have received the benefits (had they given more),
cumulative experimental earnings from previous rounds, and also own-contributions relative to
the average of the remaining 3 team members. 19
A final variable, Dispar, is used to measure the revealed disparity in the level of token
endowments at any point in the experiment. A simple theory based on expected utility can easily
show that once a lower endowment team member becomes aware that a higher endowment
members exists in the group--this can be revealed in the announcement of the high contribution
level in any of the Absolute treatments-the perceived probability of enjoying the benefits of the
.J

incentive treatment decreases. Therefore, the variable Dispar controls for the level of
information on endowments that is currently available to each team member. Table 1 gives the
variables and their descriptions.
_____________________TABLE1HERE__________________
The individual-level contributions equation is estimated using a random effects model.
The assumptions implicit in such a model are that the team members drawn for these
experiments were sampled from a large population of individuals whose individual specific
constant terms are randomly distributed across individuals. This modeling of the constant term is
supported by Lagrange multiplier and Hausman tests of the contributions equation. Table 2
shows the results of these GLS estimations. The results of the basic test of treatment effects and
the full behavioral model are shown in the second and third columns of Table 2, while the last
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two columns reestimate these models including a control for revealed endowment information.
Note that several of the variables in Table 1 explicitly account for the fact that individual
observations within a given team are not independent of one another.20

___________________TABLE2HERE______________________
Consistent with the existing literature on voluntary contribution mechanism experiments,
the coefficient on Round suggests a decay in contributions as the final round of the treatment
approaches, and its magnitude suggests that individual contributions will decline by 16% over
the course of the treatment, ceteris paribus. The constant term suggests that about 40% of an
individual's tokens are contributed in the first round of the baseline treatment independent of
other behavioral factors.
From Table 2 we also see that the treatment variables are all statistically significant and
positive. The magnitude of each coefficient represents that treatment's contribution to total
efficiency in team giving (since these results assume that each team member would increase
percentage giving by the same amount). As such, the second and third columns of Table 2 show
that efficiency is increased by the incentive treatments from 11 to 29%, depending upon the
treatment. In column two we see that nonhandicapped incentives offer smaller efficiency gains
than handicapped incentives. Column four, however, sheds some light on this issue. Column
four shows the results from the estimation when controlling for the level of endowment
information available to team members. Comparing columns two and four of Table 2 we note
that efficiency improvements are actually larger in the nonhandicapped treatments once we
control for the level of endowment information. Columns three and five of Table 2 show the
results from similar estimations which include the additional behavioral variables.

15
In the specifications of the last two columns of Table 2, we evaluate the coefficients of
the Absolute treatments at the mean level of Dispar for each endowment level to breakdown the
estimated treatment effects accounting for the level of endowment information the team members
have. When including the joint effect of Dispar and the nonhandicapped treatments, the
percentage efficiency improvements for AbslntPen, AbsPen, and AbsPrz for endowment levels
high to low are, respectively, 38,26,11,-2: 33,21,6,-9: and 33,20,6,-8 in the basic treatment
effects model (column four), and 32,23,12,2: 27,18,6,-5: 28,19,7, -3 in the full specification
(column five). As such, average team efficiency increases by 18.25%, 12.75%, and 12.75% in
the AbslntPen, AbsPen, and AbsPrz treatments of the base model, and by 17.25%, 11.5%, and
12.75% in the full specification?l These efficiency gains are then comparable to columns two
and three of Table 2 for the Absolute treatments, but it highlights the fact that efficiency
improvements are estimated to be quite high for the high endowment individual and quite low
(even negative) for the low endowment individual compared to the Baseline.
Focusing and the models in columns two and three of Table 2, handicapped incentives
generally improve efficiency the most. However, when handicapping is not used internalized
penalties are more effective than prizes or noninteralized penalties. We reject the hypothesis that
the coefficients on all of the incentive treatments are equal (p=.00). Under the base specification
.,

of column two, Table 2, we note that when handicapping is used, prizes and noninternalized
penalties generate 11-12% greater efficiency than internalized penalties. However, when no
handicapping is used, internalized penalties increase efficiency by 5-6% more than prizes or
nonintemalized penalties. Also, if prizes or noninternalized penalties are used they increase
efficiency by 16% more when used with handicapping as opposed to no handicapping (all results
are from F-tests of the pairwise difference in coefficients). Most comparisons are significant at
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the .01 level, although the most intriguing result-that internalized penalties are more effective
when no handicapping is used-is significant at the .10 level. 22 This last result is salient and
suggests that penalties and prizes, while substitutable to some extent in eliciting additional giving
in team environments, have quite different complementarities with absolute versus handicapped .
levels of contributions.
The introduction of additional behavioral variables decreases the magnitudes of the
coefficients on the treatment variables, but not their significance or ordering. It also substantially
improves the explanatory power of the models. Focusing on column three of Table 2, we note
that several of the coefficients of the behavioral variables are statistically significant and their
interpretation provides additional insights into team giving. The positive and statistically
significant coefficient on Benefit is quite large in magnitude at .18. As such, being the sole
recipient of the benefits of a Prize treatment (or the benefits of a Penalty treatment by way of not
having any earnings subtracted) increases one's contributions by 18% on top of the incentive
effects of the treatments themselves. The coefficient on Share implies that the positive effects of

Benefit would be diluted slightly when sharing the benefits of any incentive treatment, but the
coefficient is statistically insignificant.
Team members apparently also feel some regret when they could have received benefits
of the incentive program but did not. In fact, the positive and precisely estimated coefficient on

Oppwin suggests that when this is the case, team members contribute an additional 15% in the
next round. Though small in magnitude, the coefficient on TotalEarn suggests that as
cumulative earnings rise, contributions fall. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that for
each extra $1.00 in cumulative earnings, the team member decreases contributions each round by
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10% (about 2 tokens).23 It is possible, though, that this variable is capturing the cumulative
experience of the team member in the group giving environment.
. The final variable of behavioral interest, Deviate, is a significant determinant of
contributions and the positive sign on its coefficient suggests that individuals contributing above
their residual team average tend to contribute more in the following round, whereas those
contributing less than their residual team average tend to contribute less. The magnitude of the
coefficient is consistent with Dickinson (1998). Though apparently small, the magnitude of .01
actually implies a nontrivial change in absolute levels of individual-level contributions. For
example, suppose that the residual group mean level of (absolute) tokens is 20 and you
contributed 10. Then deviate=-10, and the coefficient on Deviate implies that in the following
round your contributions percentage will decline by 10%. This implies a change in contributions
of two to three tokens in the next round depending upon your initial endowment. Its positive
j

sign suggests that those who contribute the bulk of the team's tokens will continue to do so while
those who free-ride more than others will continue to do so, ceteris paribus. 24
If we next focus our attention on the same behavioral model including the control for
revealed endowment information (column five), we see that some of the coefficients in column
three were capturing some of the effect of the revealed ability information. Coefficients on the
endowment level dummies are all statistically insignificant in the model of column three, but in
column five the highest two endowment levels will actually contribute a lower percentage of
their tokens to the group account, holding other factors constant. Given heterogeneous
endowment levels, this would occur if, ceteris paribus, all team members contribute about the
same absolute number of tokens. The significance of the other coefficients is not affected by the
inclusion of Dispar, but the magnitude of the coefficients on Oppwin and Benefit does decrease.
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5. Implications and Concluding Remarks
These results have numerous implications for the work team manager. A wide variety of
incentive plans can increase work team effort. In general, we find that employers or work team
managers can expect to get what they pay for. Implementing a handicapped incentive scheme
requires ability information, but the cost of gathering the ability information is rewarded through
12%-29% higher efficiency levels. Equity is not, therefore, incompatible with efficiency
(consistent with Schotter and Weigelt (1992) and Dickinson and Isaac (1998). This result is not
entirely due to better incentives with handicapping, but in part due to the fact that
nonhandicapped incentives reveal ability information to team members. The net result is that
nonhandicapping provides smaller efficiency gains (11 %-18%) and also a wider variance in
giving within the team-the latter may negatively affect team cohesion. Given that ability
information is costly to gather, employers facing the highest costs of gathering information may
j

be ex ante inclined to not use any handicapping. It is an important implication of this paper that
employers resolved to using absolute incentive mechanisms may improve efficiency the most
through using well-internalized penalties. 25
We should note that our penalties might not be what first come to an employer's mind
when considering penalties. We established internalized penalties as a viable means of eliciting
effort by increasing the initial endowment of all team members and then fining everyone except
the team member who supplies the greatest effort during each period (e.g., fine all but the
salesperson bringing in the most business). Practically speaking, for those employees whose
output is easily measured (e.g., sales or vegetable picking), and when it is quite costly to gather
ability information (e.g., temporary or seasonal workers), such monetary fines may promise the
largest efficiency gains. Alternatively, handicapping would be more probable when dealing with
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those who have a large amount of data available on their work performance (e.g., professional
team athletes), and they would not require a well-internalized penalty to be effective.
. Consider that an employer could post a bond to each worker at the beginning of a work
period. If the work period is short, the employee may not internalize the bond money. If the
work period is long then the employee may internalize the money to a greater extent. 26 The
requirement of internalized penalties for the most effective nonhandicapped incentives may
suggest that basic fines are more effective in nonhandicapped environments than bond posting.
In the case of both positive and negative incentives, the incentive programs may be selffunding. That is, the additional wealth generated by the introduction of the incentive program is
more than the size of the incentive used. Of course, this does not take into account the cost of
gathering information of effort and/or ability, but it is a step towards making the incentives
viable in the workplace. In our experiments, when 10 or more tokens are contributed by the
team, the incentive is funded (since this generates 20 cents in group-wide wealth). In our
optimally matched incentive programs, Relative Prize increases team contributions on average by
about 24 tokens, and Absolute Internalized Penalty increases team contributions by about 21.5
tokens-both incentive programs could conceivably fund the' incentive through some type of
internal taxation. This possibility is a clear area for additional research and experimentation.
'>

While the possibility of an innovative type of penalizing that promises higher efficiency
gains under certain circumstances is attractive and novel, we should not forget that such penalties
may deteriorate employee moral. Additional research must be expended to further explore the
possibility of the penalizing programs. Logistically, any contractual agreement that would
refund an employer posted bond, for example, should be specific as to whether it is partially or
fully refunded, under what conditions this occurs, and the bond would need to be posted at the
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beginning of each work period. These are important details to the successful implementation of
any penalizing incentive program.
A drawback of the particular production function implicit in the public good
determination is that it implies independence of individual team inputs (as is true of most
experimental public goods mechanisms). In other words, team output, and therefore team
payoffs, are immune to complete free-riders (assuming that others provide effort). A more
realistic team production function might include a higher degree of team member
interdependence. An extreme case would be Y=A *min{YI'Y2'Y3,Y4} (A=scale constant).27 How
such a production function affects the marginal incentives to contribute is obviously important to
fully understand how such interdependence might affect team outcomes. Nonetheless, team
interdependence may be an important in identifying the best incentive environment.
Finally, we have not tested the long-run properties of the incentive environments.
.J

Nonhandicapped incentives tend to increase the gap between the high effort individual and the
rest of the team, whereas the handicapped incentive creates a broader base of interest for the
employees since anyone can at least share in part of the incentive. Nonhandicapped incentives
may not encourage the work team cohesion that is typically desired. Also, penalties may foster
bad relations in the long-run between employer and employees. These incentives may then be
more effective in short-term work relationships. This final point highlights another area where
further study would be useful.

ENDNOTES
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I

While not addressing the same issues as in this paper, a couple of other experimental studies

examine work effort by conducting real effort experiments. The interested reader is directed to
Dickinson (1999), and van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (2000).
2

While the purpose of this paper is to explore positive and negative incentives with and without

handicapping, we do not address the various other forms of team incentives that exist. The
reader is directed to N albantian and Schotter (1998) for an experimental investigation some
common incentive plans.
3

Furthermore, Lazear and Rosen (1981) implies that a rank ordering of wage payments must be

given for any number of team members, whereas our experiment offer only one incentive for the
entire team.
4

The existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria will be discuss~d later in the paper.

5

Dickinson and Isaac's framework differs in that they use 5-member teams where we use 4-

member teams. The experimental parameters discussed in this paper are adjusted so that the
marginal incentives are comparable.
6

To see that this quasi-penalizing of team members tied for high contributions is equivalent, note

that if Nt team members are tied for the high contribution level in the prize treatment, and some
then the marginal prizy
team members contributes one more token in order to gain the full prize,
-,
gain of that additional token contributed is (Nt-l )/Nt-of the prize. The loss to those who were tied
and now are not high contributors is 1M of the prize. With the penalty environment, if Nt team
members are tied with the high contribution level and one team member contributes an additional
token, then the marginal gain is that the individual no longer pays the ~ -1)M share of the
penalty. The loss to the rest is that they are now simply "not high contributors" and will

J
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therefore pay the full penalty each. Their loss is then 1M of the penalty. Given that the penalty
and prize are of the same size, this tie-breaking rule establishes the penalty treatments as
identical in marginal incentives to the prize treatments.
The intuition behind the lack of pure strategy Nash equilibria is as follows: Since some team

7

member is always endowed with more tokens than all the others, it is in his best interest to
always avoid the penalty (see penalty saliency condition). However, all other team members
would then be best off by contributing zero due to the free-riding incentive. Of course, if all
others contribute zero, then the high contributor has an incentive to only contribute one token and
still avoid the penalty, but this would induce contributions to spiral upward among team
members until the individual with the largest token endowment wins out--at this point the
argument starts over again. A similar argument follows for the Relative Penalty treatment as
well as for the prize treatments.
A more simplified normal form game with strategies of only mi=O or mi=wi yields a pure

8

strategy Nash equilibrium where both individuals free ride. A larger strategy space is necessary
to highlight our desired results.
9

In this alternative parameterization, the Absolute Prize mixing equilibrium is {25%, 31 %, 44%}

for the low and {63%, 31 %, 6%} for the high endowment individual"whereas the Relative Prize
equilibrium is {13%, 75%, 12%} for the low and {38%, 25%, 37%} for the high endowment
individual.
10

A complete set of all experimental instructions is available from the author by request.

11

As we will see, the ordering of efficiency outcomes in Relative Prize, Absolute Prize, and

Baseline treatment are identical to those in Dickinson and Isaac where they randomized the
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ordering of all treatments including the Baseline, and so we do not believe placing the Baseline
first affects the results. More importantly for our experiments, initial Baseline treatment helped
"train" the subjects in the basic institution before the added details of the penalty treatments are
seen.
12

In the actual experimental instructions and procedures, terms such as "group" and "private"

accounts were actually labeled accounts X and Y. Similar neutral language was used throughout
the instructions and procedures. The "Prize", for example, was referred to as the "additional 20
cents."
13

Previous public goods experiments have shown the efficiency-enhancing effects of nonbinding

communication among team members (see, for example, Isaac and Walker (1988b) and Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1991)), but the main purpose of these experiments is to explore positive versus
negative incentives as our first step towards evaluating the roles and complementarities of the
incentives and the handicapping rule.
14

The notion of a reference point is a critical point in the prospect theory of Kahneman and

Tversky (1979). Prospect theory implies that, from a given reference point, loss aversion would
render negative incentives more effective than positive incentives in motivating individuals.
While reference points and loss aversion may say something about th~ results in team work
environments, the problem is compounded by the group dynamic.
15

This shift in endowments is also useful in mitigating any potential income effects since the

new endowment levels are chosen so that expected earnings at the efficient outcome are identical
under penalties and prizes. We see this by noting that under prizes, total team earnings at the
Pareto optimal outcome are 180 cents (160 cents of group account earnings plus the prize of 20
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cents). Under penalties, total team earnings are also 180 cents (240 cents of group account
earning minus 60 cents in total penalties. This, because only one individual is not assessed the
penalty meaning that 3 of 4 individuals are penalized 20 cents each round).
16

These results are also consistent with Dickinson and Isaac in that handicapped prizes increased

efficiency by an amount greater than non-handicapped prizes.
17

For these Mann-Whitney tests, the unit of analysis is the difference between the maximum and

minimum average contributions for each round (note that this is slightly different then the
aggregation by endowment levels shown in Figure 2). For each round, maximum and minimum
contributions are taken and averaged across the 10 experiments in which the same treatments
were completed by each team (recall that some experiments used internalized penalties, and
some used penalties). The gap still exists if one calculates the gap in percentage giving rather
than absolute giving.
18

Under this interpretation, the strong free-riding incentive of the baseline treatment is similar to

theoretical predictions that once minimum effort requirements are made, employees will
contribute at minimum effort as an equilibrium prediction.
19

The variable Deviate, which describes an individual's deviation from the residual group

average level of contributions is used in Dickinson (1998) and is a significant determinant of
contribution levels in his voluntary contributions mechanism experiments.
20

An alternative approach would be to simply estimate a model of treatment effect using the

team contributions level as the unit of observation. This modeling, while lacking in any
behavioral variables, yields coefficient estimates on treatment variables that are virtually

J
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identical in magnitude and significance as the estimates of Table 2 (results available upon
request).
21

Here, we calculate the effect of Dispar separately for the average team member by evaluating

the coefficient at the mean level of Dispar for each endowment level for all experiments.
22

A separate regression on data from the 10 experiments that included the internalized penalty

treatments (rather than the pooled data from all 20 experiment) finds significance at the 50/0 level
for this result.
23

This calculation excludes the $5 show-up fee from cumulative earnings, as does the variable

Tola/Earn.
24

Dickinson (1998) offers two explanations for the positive sign on the coeffiCient of Deviate.

First, the positive sign will result if, as contributions decay through time, those who are above
(below) average contributors experience a slower-than-average (faster-than-average) decay rate
in their contributions (this hypothesis was originally suggested by Stan Reynolds). A second
explanation is that below average contributors learn to free ride even more, while above average
contributors may increase contributions in attempt to "stoke the fire" and get others to contribute.
25

Perhaps it should not be surprising that institutions such as the military and catholic schools

tend to lean toward negative incentives. Such incentives may be complementary with the higher
importance they place on absolute standards. ·
26

On the other hand, shorter work periods may mean that less information is revealed on

abilities. This would tend to make all types of nonhandicapped incentives more effective.
27

This production function and the idea of including more team interdependence were suggested

to me by Alessandro Rossi.
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TABLE 1
variable names and descriptions
VARIABLE NAME
Givei (Dependent Variable)

DESCRIPTION
=% of tokens contributed to team (group) account

Hi, MidHi, Midlow

=Dummy variables for Highest, 2 nd highest, and 3 rd
highest endowment levels in team

AbsPen, AbsRelPen, AbsPrz, RelPen,
RelIntPen, RelPrz,

=Dummy variables for each incentive treatment

Benefit

=1 if individual received incentive benefits (by
himlherself or shared) in previous round

Share

=number of individuals who shared in incentive
benefits in previous round

TotalEam

=subject's cumulative earning (in cents) for the
experiment in current round

Round

=the round of the treatment (i.e., 1-8)
J

Oppwin

Deviate

Dispar

=1 if individual had the opportunity to receive
incentive benefits in previous round, but did not (e.g.,
top contributor was 10 tokens, and your endowment is
17 tokens ... you could have received benefits)
=your deviation from the rest of the team's average
contribution level. Your contribution (absolute) minus
residual group mean contributions (absolute levels)
=the size of the revealed disparity in token
endowments in any rior round of the ex eriment
Total Observations=3200
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TABLE 2
Random Effects Modeling of Individual-level % Contributions
Dependent variable=GiveI *
Variable
Coef. (p-value) Coef. (p-value)
.41 (.00)*
Constant
.43 (.00)*
.18 (.00)*
AbsIntPen
.16 (.00)*
.12 (.00)*
AbsPen
.11 (.00)*
.13 (.00)*
AbsPrz
.11 (.00)*
.17 (.00)*
.12 (.00)*
RelIntPen
.28 (.00)*
RelPen
.20 (.00)*
.29 (.00)*
.21 (.00)*
RelPrz
-.02 (.00)*
-.02 (.00)*
Round
.00 (.95)
Hi
---.05 (.24)
Midhi
---.01 (.90)
Midlow
--.18 (.00)*
Benefit
--Share
---.01 (.35)
-.001 (.00)*
--TotalEarn
.15 (.00)*
Oppwin
--.01
(.00)*
Deviate
--Dispar
----R2
.07
.16
Observation=3200
*Represent significance at the 5% level or better.

Coef. (p-value)
.39 (.00)*
.38 (.00)*
.33 (.00)*
.33 (.00)*
.17 (.00)*
.29 (.00)*
.29 (.00)*
-.02 (.00)*

-------

-----

-------.08 (.00)*
.11

Coef. (p-value)
.46 (.00)*
.32 (.00)*
.27 (.00)*
.28 (.00)*
.15 (.00)*
.24 (.00)*
.25 (.00)*
-.02 (.00)*
-.09 (.04)*
-.13 (.00)*
-.03 (.44)
.08 (.02)*
.00 (.70)
-.001 (.01)*
.06 (.01)*
.01 (.00)*
-.06 (.00)*
.18
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FIGURE 1: Aggregate Results
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FIGURE 2
~Hi

Tokens contributed by endowment level--Prizes and
Internalized Penalties Experiments: By Tokens*
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APPENDIX A: Penalty Saliency

The prize saliency condition of Dickinson and Isaac (1998) is that
(max {Wi} )(1- ~) < P < (min {W i })( N - a) where max and min refer to the maximum and
N
minimum endowment levels of the team members, respectively. Note the change in notation
relative to our equation (1). In Dickinson and Isaac, the payoff function in (1) is written as

a2: m
j

Ui=q(wi-mJ+

N

so that our parameter a is the same as the Dickinson and Isaac parameter

alN. We will proceed in the appendix using the Dickinson and Isaac parameters. As such, our
parameterization as described in the paper is one where q=l, a=2, and N=4. The bounds for
prize saliency, given our parameterization are that 11.5<P<34. Since the penalty is essentially a
negative prize, we will call the penalty P-<O and the prize P+>O henceforth.
j

It is important to note here that in order to mirror the marginal incentives of the prize
treatments, we assess a penalty to all individuals who are not the highest contributors. While this
may at first seem an unlikely compensation scheme for a real world work environment, the
importance of a reference point should be highlighted. For example, promotion policies for toplevel jobs tend to promote only a small proportion of workers to these jobs. If a candidate
"

considers himlherself a strong candidate, then to not be promoted may be internalized as a loss or
penalty by the worker. In our experimental design we endow the team members with additional
earnings or tokens that may be taken away if the member is not the high contributor-we change
the reference point of the team member.
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If a penalty of P- is assessed for not being the highest absolute or relative contributor, the
gains of contributing mi to avoid P- are -P-+ ami and the loss is mi. We seek to have this gain
N

.

am·

am·

greater than the loss so that mi<-P-+--I or P- < __I - m·. If you share in a lIN portion ofP-,
N
N
1

then contributing mi to avoid this share of the penalty results in a gain of -P- + ami and a loss

N

N

of mi. We want this gain to be smaller than the loss so that mi> - P- + ami or P- > mi (a - N) .
N
N
Combining these two conditions gives us mi (a - N) < P- < ami - mi. Since P-<O we can also
N
express this condition as mi (1- ~) < - P- < mi (N - a). Finally, we can guarantee that this .
condition is met by tightening the inequalities with respect to the endowment levels used in the
J

team so that (max {Wi} )(1- ~) < - P- < (min {W i })( N - a). In other words, choosing a penalty
N
of the same absolute value as the prize ensures penalty saliency for the team. Notice that the
parametrization in (1) is such that we also have the free-riding incentive.

